On November 6, Plamen Tonchev, Head of Asia Unit at the Institute of International Economic Relations (IIER) in Greece, visited CAPRI to talk about the complex dynamics of the relatively understudied European Southeastern Periphery, especially with regards to China in the realm of security. Drawing on a recent IIER report, Mr. Tonchev guided the audience, which included representatives from the government, the diplomatic community, think tanks, academia, and business, through China’s engagement in the region, examining its key drivers, policy tools, and constraints shaped by both NATO-aligned and nonaligned countries.
He introduced the concept of Europe’s Southeastern Periphery (ESEP), which comprises 21 countries spanning Europe’s outer edge and its “near abroad.” This region, he noted, has two active major conflict zones, namely, Ukraine and Gaza. Yet, ESEP is typically studied only in fragmented ways by considering the Western Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, and Black Sea subregions separately. This approach tends to overlook ESEP as a single, interconnected space for understanding China’s pursuits and playbook.
Mr. Tonchev identified seven indicators of China’s activity in ESEP, with peacekeeping, arms sales, and telecommunications and surveillance accounting for the highest degree of China’s engagement, particularly with Egypt, Serbia, Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey. Despite China’s permanent seat on the UN Security Council and peacekeeping missions in Lebanon, Cyprus, and Syria, its regional role remains largely symbolic or even passive, as reflected in its silence on the Greece–Turkey maritime disputes, which mirrors its own tensions in the South China Sea. China–Turkey relations, he highlighted, remain fraught despite strong arms trade ties, with underlying frictions over strategic competition in Central Asia and the Uyghur issue.
China’s involvement in the region also extends to infrastructure projects in transport and energy, naval visits, and law enforcement collaboration, fields that remain underresearched but increasingly relevant. For example, the spread of Chinese telecoms and surveillance technologies, particularly in Serbia, Egypt, and Georgia has become an emerging concern for some regional actors. Such engagements yield tangible benefits for China, opening new markets for arms sales, building strategic relationships with potential EU members like Serbia, and gaining knowledge of European standards through participation in infrastructure tenders, such as Croatia’s Pelješac Bridge project.
Despite these multifaceted efforts, Mr. Tonchev noted that China’s security engagement in ESEP has been gradually declining since 2020. Its activities in the region largely serve to project the image of a benign global power and responsible stakeholder while avoiding competition with regional powers such as Russia and Turkey.
The discussion that followed explored how this research relates to China’s Global Security Initiative and its applicability—for example, in the wake of the latest developments in the Eastern Mediterranean; the waning 17+1 framework, and China’s focus on privileged interlocutors in the region. These discussions highlighted an important paradox: despite extensive Chinese investments in ESEP, evidence remains limited as to whether they have truly strengthened the region’s economic resilience. In several ESEP countries, the Belt and Road Initiative has been mired in corruption controversies, thus limiting tangible gains for local resilience.
The participants also noted that beyond its global leadership in technology and semiconductors, Taiwan’s expertise in countering foreign interference, cyberattacks, disinformation, and gray zone tactics offers valuable lessons for ESEP countries seeking to build stronger economic and societal resilience. For policymakers in Europe and Asia alike, the region offers an important lens into both Beijing’s evolving global ambitions and their limits or, as Mr. Tonchev pointed out, the precision of China’s assessment of its own capabilities.
